R (Drysdale) v HMAC Manchester (South) [2025] EWHC 1850 (Admin) 18 July 2025, judgment here

To what extent an inquest must investigate possible causes of death is often a perplexing question. Until oral evidence is explored in a hearing it may not be known whether a possibility will crystallise into probability and so lend itself to a meaningful inquest conclusion.  In this case the criticism levelled at the coroner was that he had prevented some questioning of an expert and so not permitted relevant possibilities to be explored.

Although there was some limited research evidence supporting a possible correlation between the prescription of an anti-psychotic drug and the development of fatal leukaemia, the judge was not persuaded the coroner had been wrong when he exercised his r.19(2) power.

Once the expert had confirmed the evidence of a causative association was scant, the Area Coroner had been correct to prevent additional questioning on the issue.  There could not have been any meaningful inquest conclusion based on the expert evidence, since it revealed no more than a theoretical possibility which could not support factual or legal causation.

His Majesty’s Senior Coroner for West Yorkshire (Western District)  [2025] EWHC 1672 (Admin) 3 July 2025. Judgment here

This Divisional Court judgment recounts what should have been a completely uncontroversial application under s.13 Coroners Act 1988 for a fresh inquest.   Some highly relevant evidence had come to light which was not before the Coroner at the first inquest. Once made aware of the new information the Coroner understandably took the view that this new evidence would likely lead to a different inquest conclusion.

What makes this simple and uncontested case rather remarkable is how long it has taken for the right thing to happen and for an order for a fresh inquest to be made. The new evidence was discovered and put before the Coroner within six months of the initial inquest concluding.  Yet it was a further six years before that fresh inquest could be granted by the High Court.

Most (but by no means all) of the delay seems to have been occasioned by delays at the Attorney General’s office.  This so concerned  the Divisional Court that their Lordships announced at the end of their judgment that the Court would be sending a copy of their judgment to the Attorney-General himself, so he might be aware of the Court’s view that the delay in granting the Coroner’s request for a fiat would not only have caused further unnecessary anxiety to the deceased’s family, but may have had an adverse impact on the quality of the evidence available at the fresh inquest that is yet to be held.

Baron Hermer may now be rather peeved to be receiving a nudge from the High Court about something that was clearly not his own doing – but if the judicial nudge results in s.13 fiat applications being speeded up in future this can only be a good thing.

R (Campbell) v HM Attorney General of England and Wales [2025] EWHC 1653 (Admin) 1 July 2025 (judgment here)

Anyone wanting the High Court to quash a finding made at an inquest and order a fresh investigation and inquest under s.13 of the Coroners Act 1988 will need the approval (a fiat) of the Attorney General to proceed with their claim.  What then is the position if the Attorney General refuses to give that approval? is that the end of the road? or can the Attorney General’s refusal be challenged by judicial review?

This was the question a Divisional Court bench[1] grappled with in this factually rather remarkable case. The judgment deals only with the preliminary issue of the justiciability of a decision of the Attorney General to refuse his authority to bring an application under s.13(1)(b) of the Coroners Act 1988 (it only lightly touches on the merits of the application itself). The court’s judgment takes us on an interesting historical journey through the Attorney General’s gatekeeping function in a variety of settings. At the end you will hear that gate clang shut on the Claimant: the refusal of a fiat is not judicially reviewable [2]. However, your blogger suspects there may be another instalment to come, and so that clanging gate may not yet be firmly locked and bolted.

R (Metropolitan Police Commissioner) v Police Conduct Panel [2025] EWHC 1462 (Admin)  17 June 2025,  judgment here

Skeleton arguments and written submissions are often emailed to coroners in advance of an inquest or PIRH.  The document is rarely read out in court in full, and so any press or public sitting in court may find the resulting arguments extremely difficult to understand or follow when only partial extracts from the written document are elliptically referred to in oral submissions.

In such circumstances how are those who are entitled to attend the open public inquest hearing supposed to understand the arguments relied upon by the different interested persons or to make sense of the coroner’s ruling on a relevant matter?

This recent decision by Fordham J, reminds us that, whatever the forum, open justice requires judges and tribunals to ordinarily make skeleton arguments relied upon at a public hearing available to the press promptly if requested at that hearing.  To do so promotes open justice, as to both public scrutiny and intelligibility. It also promotes contemporaneous reporting and public confidence.