R v Foster [2026] EWCA Crim 1088, 7 August 2026 (judgment here)

This appeal case, considering the length of sentence for perverting the course of justice, should operate as a stern warning of how seriously criminal courts will view giving false accounts in anticipation of coronial investigations

The facts

Mrs Froggett, an elderly care home resident died from complications of a fractured femur after an unobserved fall from her wheelchair. The care home manager (a registered nurse), together with two care workers, created and maintained a false account that her wheelchair lap strap had been fastened when Mrs Froggett fell.

That false narrative was set out in documents produced in the knowledge that investigations by the CQC and coronial proceedings were likely to follow her death. It was also repeated in responses sent to the coroner, which went as far as suggesting that the deceased may have unfastened her lap belt herself and that the lap strap’s buckle had become defective or gone missing after the incident.

The deception came to light only because the participants were stupid enough to discuss their falsehoods in the presence of an honest staff member who properly reported the overheard discussions about the fabrication. Approximately six months later fresh accounts were produced admitting that the earlier statements had been false.  Indeed it seems that the lap strap had never even been capable of being fastened because the buckle was missing. Their false accounts had clearly included quite despicable victim blaming.

The prosecution(s) and sentence

Foster, the care home manager, was prosecuted by the CQC and was fined £800 after pleading guilty to regulatory offences relating to the care provided to Mrs Froggett. Thereafter in the Crown Court she faced further charges of wilful neglect and perverting the course of justice.  There was then a dispute whether the CPS proceeding with the neglect charge after the CQC prosecution on the same facts was an abuse of process. The outcome was that the neglect charge was stayed, at which point Foster immediately pleaded guilty to the remaining count.

At sentence, the judge considered that the offence of perverting the course of justice justified a provisional sentence of four and a half years’ imprisonment before credit for her plea. An aggravating factor was that Foster had apparently advised the other staff to lie, although they had willingly done so. The judge allowed only a 20% reduction for the plea, on the basis that Foster could have sought to enter her plea much earlier in the Crown Court proceedings. The resulting sentence was 43 months’ imprisonment.

The Appeal

On appealing her sentence the Court of Appeal agreed that a 20% reduction for plea was appropriate and declined to interfere with that aspect. However, it concluded that the judge had not given sufficient weight to Foster’s substantial personal mitigation – she had been of good character as a nurse for 40 years and showed extreme remorse (she had now been struck off). There had also been an element of double counting when considering the aggravating features.

The Court of Appeal described the original sentence as ‘manifestly excessive’ holding that the appropriate sentence for the offence was four years. Applying the same 20% discount, it substituted a sentence of 38 months’ imprisonment in place of the original 43 months.

Comment

The false narrative in this case survived in writing alone for six months, albeit one might think it would likely have remained intact but for the intervention of the whistleblower. Such a steep sentence should perhaps then be no surprise given the offending would inevitably have distorted the coroner’s ability to determine the true cause of death had it prevailed.

This case must stand as a clear warning to all inquest witnesses that you should never seek to shape the narrative before an inquest. That this falsehood was only in written evidence and was not (yet) perjury under oral examination did not lessen its seriousness. All early written accounts (whether written with or without a statement of truth) should be treated with the same care as oral evidence later given in court under oath.  Deliberate attempts to distort the factual record will be taken very seriously and anyone who knowingly gives an inaccurate account following a death risks similar criminal proceedings and will be at risk of a hefty custodial sentence.

All witnesses should be aware that attempts to frustrate the function of His Majesty’s Coroner, even where the deception ultimately fails, might well be followed by a significant period held at His Majesty’s pleasure.

 

Protocol for Legal Professionals Wishing to Raise Concerns Informally About Judicial Behaviour.   8 July 2026

 Protocol for Legal Professionals Wishing to Raise Concerns Informally About Coroner Behaviour 22 July 2026

Following on from the Harman Review, the Lady Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals last week issued a new Protocol for Legal Professionals Wishing to Raise Concerns Informally About Judicial Behaviour. The document formalises what is said to be a practice that has existed for many years: the ability of lawyers to raise concerns about judicial conduct through informal channels rather than making a formal complaint to the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (‘JCIO’).[1] 

The aim is straightforward enough. If a judge has a brief loss of temper or makes an ill-judged remark, advocates are encouraged either to raise it directly with the judge or to ask a leadership judge to have a quiet word.

Although the protocol expressly states that it excludes Coroners,[2] practitioners appearing in Coroners’ Courts, should not feel left out.  This  merely reflect the constitutional position of the coronial jurisdiction, sitting outside the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, rather than any principled non-application of the approach promoted in this guidance.  Indeed hot on its heels the Chief Coroner has now issued her own protocol for legal professionals about what to do when the bad behaviour is that of a Coroner. The Chief’s new protocol is intended to support a professional, respectful, and constructive working environment within the coroner service and to promote early resolution where it is appropriate.

R (Roome) v Senior Coroner for Gloucestershire & TikTok Info Tech UK Ltd. [2026] EWHC 1808 (Admin) 16 July 2026 – judgment here.

Social media is not just an important aspect of many people’s lives, but may also provide an important insight  into how they came by their death. This latest High Court judgment provides an illustration of how coronial investigations will have to adapt to a world in which crucial evidence may reside within social media platforms, messaging applications and digital ecosystems that were barely considered relevant in inquests only a few years ago.

UCPI Designated Lawyer Officers Core Participant Group v Sir John Mitting (Chairman of the Undercover Policing Inquiry) [2026] EWHC 1394 (Admin) (judgment here) 9 June 2026

Anyone who thought that disappearing abroad would provide a procedural invisibility cloak if an Inquiry chair or Coroner wanted to hear their evidence is now going to have to think again. In this latest Divisional Court decision arising out of the Undercover Policing Inquiry the Chair, Sir John Mitting, has just successfully defended his issuing of a witness summons to a witness abroad. Consequently any cloak may now wear thinner than an overused metaphor if that witness ever wants to set foot in the jurisdiction again.

Although the case arises from a Public Inquiry rather than an inquest, coroners and inquest practitioners should read it with care. The judgment contains a detailed judicial analysis of compulsory attendance powers and territorial limits challenging the previous assumption that inquiries (and by analogy inquests) have no power to issue a summons to a witness who is abroad.

R (Przybys) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2026] EWHC 1159 (Admin) 15 May 2026 (judgment here)

This Administrative Court decision reviews the interrelationship between police investigations, regulatory processes and coronial decision-making.  Although the Senior Coroner for Manchester City was not a party to these proceedings, the court identified the coroner’s earlier assessment of this being a natural death that did not require an inquest, as a factor which Greater Manchester Police (‘GMP’) was entitled to take into account when deciding not to launch a criminal investigation into alleged gross negligence manslaughter.

Any coroners still smarting after being referred to as a ‘lower judicial officer’ in the Norfolk [1]case may now take some comfort from Coppel J’s recognition of the legitimacy of police decision-making being informed by the position of the ‘expert’ Coroner.