Re JS (Disposal of Body)  EWHC 2859 (Fam) 10 November 2016

Last month saw the three Brexit judges on the front pages, unfairly lambasted by the media just for doing their jobs properly. It’s a shame that the press who seem, on the whole, to rather like this latest Family Court decision, haven’t sought to make Mr Justice Peter Jackson their cover star this month, this time with a huge respect for a judge who has done his job extremely well. In a clear, concise and incredibly sensitive judgment – superbly drafted not only in what it says, but in how he makes inferences about those matters that he doesn't explicitly describe – Peter Jackson J has dealt with what must be one of the most difficult and tragic cases to come before the courts this year.   

The case has been hailed in the headlines as a victory for “the right to be cryogenically frozen” although if the sub-editors had bothered to read this admirably plainly written judgment properly (which you can read here) they would find that Jackson J confirms exactly the opposite.   

There is simply no right of anyone, child or adult, to determine what happens to your own body after you die. Your dead body is not your own property to be disposed of by your will. The decision will always be left in the hands of others.

As an adult you can of course write a will, name your own executors, express your wishes and then hope that you have chosen your executors wisely. Happily, in most cases the people you have nominated will obey your wishes and dispose of your body as you have asked; but if they decide not to comply with your request there is little you can do about it.

The principle of open justice, allowing pubic scrutiny of how citizens come by their deaths, is at the core of the inquest process.  Save in exceptional circumstances[1] Inquests should be heard in open court with the media able to fully report the proceedings.

“The names of those who are born and those who die are rightly a matter of public record.  The fact that someone has died is always a matter of proper public interest and the ability to record it is a normal incident of society.”[2]

Readers will be familiar with Coroners’ powers under Section 39(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 to restrict reporting of the name of a child who is a witness or an IP. However Coroners have very limited alternative powers to protect the vulnerable who are not themselves an IP or  witness at the inquest.  

In exceptional cases, High Court judges have powers to make or extend a Reporting Restrictions Order (RRO) to protect others, such as family members of the deceased, from unwelcome press attention  (see earlier UK Inquest Law Blog post here re an RRO made in the Court of Protection in anticipation of an inquest).

However another often overlooked provision applicable to Coronial proceedings, and used effectively in a recent inquest, is Section 1 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992.

R (on the application of Secretary of State for Transport) (Claimant) v HM Senior Coroner for Norfolk (Defendant) & British Airline Pilots Association (Intervener) [2016] EWHC 2279 (Admin)


Readers of the UK Inquest Law Blog need no reminding that prior to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, coroners had no power to order disclosure of any document so that if disclosure was required, an application had to be made to the High Court. The immediate point for the Divisional Court to decide in this case was the correct interpretation of the powers of coroners to require a person to produce documents (paragraph 2 of Schedule 5 of the 2009 Act). 

The involvement of the Lord Chief Justice indicates that there is a point of general importance.

R (Maxine Hamilton-Jackson) v HM Assistant Coroner for Mid Kent and Medway [2016] EWHC 1796 (Admin) (decision 19.7.16 here)


The absence of opening or closing speeches at inquests means that the need for clarity when summing up is all the more important. The jury must know clearly what they need to find as facts in order to justify any conclusion and, as the Chief Coroner has put it:

“Coroners, however well intentioned, should do their best in directing a jury to avoid using language which is not in everyday use, language which may not be clearly understood”. 

So what are an inquest jury to make of being told they need to decide whether or not there was a failure of a prison system or in the operation of a prison system, by “polarising the dichotomy between: is it mandatory to open an ACCT when a particular event occurs or is it mandatory to open an ACCT when the relevant official considers there is a risk of suicide or self-harm?”

Quashing the jury’s response to just one part of the jury questionnaire in this case, the Divisional Court has held that not only was there a misdirection, because the jury could not be clear what they were being asked to decide, but also re-iterated how the meaning of a policy is not a matter of fact to be determined by the jury, but is a question of law to be determined by the Coroner.

R (Tyrrell) v Senior Coroner for Durham & Darlington [2016] EWHC 1892 (Admin)  

(26.7.16 decision here)

 Around two thirds of the 250 deaths in prison each year are from a naturally occurring cause. In a decision that will be warmly welcomed by Coroners, the Divisional Court has now determined that there is no obligation to hold an Art 2 inquest into such deaths unless there are grounds to believe that there was some failure in the healthcare provided by the state.

This case in which the Claimant’s arguments were described as being advanced at a “high level of legal abstraction” is happily a victory for pragmatism and common sense.   

Were it otherwise Coroners would be obliged to conduct a large number of ‘Article 2 inquests’, to no discernable benefit of anyone and despite it being abundantly clear before the hearing that nothing untoward had taken place.

Burke-Monerville v HM Senior Coroner of Inner North London 

Application for urgent relief  High Court: Fri 8 July

The trend of recent decisions in the High Court has been a general reluctance to hear challenges to coroners' procedural decisions prior to the end of an inquest. Whether the proceedings have or have not been substantively or procedurally unfair is an issue that is best determined after the end of the hearing when the totality of the proceedings and the evidence can be considered.

It is unsurprising therefore that this urgent application for an injunction seeking to prevent an inquest going ahead on a Monday morning was refused in an extempore decision delivered at midnight on Friday.