Art 2 inquest required where a ‘credible suggestion’ of a breach of substantive rights

Written by: Andrew Perfect
Published: 23 October 2020

R (Skelton) v Senior Coroner for West Sussex and the Chief Constable of Sussex Police & Robert Trigg (interested parties) [2020] EWHC 2813 (Admin)

Determining whether Art 2 procedural obligations are engaged at an inquest can be one of the most challenging legal questions in the coronial jurisdiction. The issue for a coroner is not whether breaches of a substantive Art 2 duty have been made out, but whether such breaches are “arguable”.

The Divisional Court have made it clear that, when considering arguability, coroners should apply the test in Maguire[1], asking themselves whether there is a ‘credible suggestion’ that a breach of substantive Art 2 rights may be established after the further and fuller investigation of all the evidence which will be available at a Middleton inquest.

Further, should a coroner’s decision be challenged with unqualified human rights in play, the Divisional Court’s role is not to assess the quality of the decision on pure public law grounds but to apply heightened scrutiny, effectively asking itself the same question that the coroner has considered. Hence in practical terms there can only be one right answer and a rationality challenge collapses into a merits review.

Impermissible to challenge a criminal conviction at a fresh inquest

Written by: Andrew Perfect
Published: 23 October 2020

R (Skelton) v Senior Coroner for West Sussex and the Chief Constable of Sussex Police & Robert Trigg (interested parties) [2020] EWHC 2813 (Admin)

Whilst many will be unsurprised to be told that a fresh inquest cannot reach a verdict inconsistent with an earlier homicide conviction, it is nevertheless reassuring to learn that a statutory lacuna on this issue has now been firmly filled by the Divisional Court in this recent case.

The relevant part of the CJA 2009 clearly states that if an inquest is suspended and later resumed after a homicide conviction the conclusion of the inquest may not be inconsistent with the criminal jury’s determination. This recent challenge arose in the context of a situation not addressed in the statute: where a wholly fresh inquest was to be held.

An equivocal admission pre-inquest will not prevent costs being recovered

Written by: Jamie Mathieson
Published: 21 October 2020

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service v Veevers [2020] EWHC 2550 (Comm)

Can a family’s inquest costs be recovered in a subsequent civil claim if an admission has been made prior to the inquest? If the admission has in fact been informal or equivocal, the answer may well be yes.

The background

This claim arose from the tragic death of Mrs Veevers’ son, a firefighter, who died in a fire of 2013 from hypoxia and heat exhaustion. Around two months before an inquest was due to begin in 2016, and after the family representatives had already undertaken ‘extensive investigations’, the solicitors for the fire service wrote to their counterparts for Mrs Veevers, setting out:

‘Our clients have made no assessment of the potential for liability to the estate and dependants of (the deceased) but they have instructed us to set out their position in relation to any potential claim which may be brought for the family…Our clients are not in a position to consider an admission of liability and we have not undertaken a detailed forensic analysis of the potential for liability in any civil claim on their behalf. The purpose and objective in making the comments which we make directly below is to attempt to remove any additional stress from the family during and immediately after the inquest…We write in open correspondence in order to advise that our clients are willing to compensate the estate and dependents of Stephen Hunt pursuant to the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 and Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, for any loss which they may prove to be attributable to the incident on 13 July 2013 together with payment of their reasonable costs.’

The six-week inquest was heard with a jury who returned a conclusion of unlawful killing, the jury finding the fire was probably started deliberately.[1] Civil proceedings were subsequently issued and it was admitted that the fire service were liable for failing to ensure the deceased did not exceed the maximum time using breathing apparatus and PPE. The fire service also agreed to pay Mrs Veevers’ reasonable costs. Her total costs bill was £334,000. She sought recovery of the costs incurred by her legal representatives preparing for and attending the inquest, which amounted to £141,000, over 40% of all of her costs.

Are inquests the right forum to consider inadequate PPE? Updated guidance published

Written by: Clare Hennessy
Published: 6 July 2020

Chief Coroner’s Guidance No. 37 – “COVID-19 Deaths and Possible Exposure in the Workplace” amended 1.7.2020

It is not often that guidance from the Chief Coroner excites the twittersphere. But the original version of this Guidance #37, issued on 28 April (see our earlier blog here), managed to generate much comment from the public, Doctor’s Associations and even MPs regarding the approach to considering shortcomings in the provision of PPE. The Chief Coroner puts out guidance, he does not make statements of policy. Some seem to have even misunderstood his guidance to be advocating that healthcare workers’ deaths should not be referred to a coroner[1]. Nevertheless, many commentators will feel vindicated in that the Chief Coroner has now updated his earlier Guidance which now focuses more on the individual judicial discretion of each coroner.

Keeping expert evidence secret at an inquest

Written by: Matthew Holdcroft, Bridget Dolan KC
Published: 1 July 2020

Re Ketcher and Mitchell [2020] NICA 31

There has rightly been increasing emphasis since the Mid Staffs inquiry and other high media profile investigations, such as Hillsborough, on the responsibility of public bodies to be open and candid in all of their dealings with the Coroner. Whilst legislation falls short of imposing a statutory duty of candour in respect of inquests, the expectation many will have of our public bodies is that they will do all they can to assist the coronial investigation in ascertaining the truth of how a person came to die, regardless of any reputational consequences or fear of future litigation. Indeed the Ministry of Justice has recently published the Government’s protocol that sets out the principles it expects to guide the behaviour of Government Legal Department lawyers and those they instruct at inquests. This includes an exhortation to “approach the inquest with openness and honesty, including supporting the disclosure of all relevant and disclosable information to the coroner” which they suggest should be a ‘model of behaviour’ for all interested persons (see Annexe A).

Against that background this recent decision from the Northern Irish Court of Appeal may seem rather out of kilter with the laudable aim of openness. Although expert evidence obtained solely for the purpose of an inquest will not, say the NI CA, attract litigation privilege, any compulsion to disclose such a report will, in the view of the Court, be highly likely to be unreasonable as being contrary to the public interest in encouraging interested persons to investigate and prepare their own cases.

Notably however, the context here was an expert report obtained on behalf the bereaved families in an Art 2 inquest – it is more difficult predict whether, if it were a public body seeking to suppress relevant evidence in an Art 2 inquest, the public interest balance would still be drawn in the same place.