The Notification of Deaths Regulations 2019

The Notification of Deaths Regulations 2019[1] come into effect on 1 October 2019 and will place a legal duty on ALL doctors who come to know of a death to ensure it has been reported to a Coroner where any of the circumstances that might trigger the Coroner’s investigatory duties appear to be present.

Although for over half a century, under the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953[2], the deceased’s ‘attending medical practitioner’ (‘AMP’) has been required to provide the Registrar with a medical certificate of the cause of death (‘MCCD’), until now there has been no statutory obligation upon the AMP, or any other doctor, to either directly notify the Coroner or ensure the Coroner has been informed by another medical colleague of a death falling within the Coroner’s jurisdiction[3].

The circumstances in which the doctor’s notification duty will now arise largely parallel those situations falling under s.1(2) Coroners and Justice Act 2009 which would give rise to the Coroner’s own investigatory duty – i.e. when the doctor suspects the death was violent or unnatural (including from neglect or self-neglect) or that it occurred whilst the deceased was in state detention or where the cause of death is unknown or the identity of the deceased is not established.

“Better safeguards with the additional scrutiny of deaths”

Previously it would often be the Registrar or a Police Officer who would notify the Coroner of a death in the community. From tomorrow, wherever a notifiable death has occurred of which a doctor is aware that death must also be reported directly to the Coroner by a medical practitioner.

Fullick v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2019] EWHC 1941 (QB)

The funding of representation for the bereaved at inquests is not just an un-level playing field, but a total quagmire often more akin to the aftermath of an outing of the 1988 Pontypool front row on a rainy day in December. The costs of representation at an inquest will only be met from public funds in cases deemed to be ‘exceptional’ (where, as a minimum, Art 2 is engaged or where it can be shown that the provision of advocacy for the bereaved family at the inquest is likely to produce significant benefits for a wider class of people). Calls for non-means tested funding for the bereaved, even though supported by the Chief Coroner[1], have been rejected[2] [3]. Even the families of those killed in the London Bridge attack were told it was not in the public interest for them to receive state funding at the inquests[4].

Against that background, it is unsurprising that there is a growing body of case law regarding the recovery of the bereaved’s inquest costs as part of the costs of a subsequent successful civil claim. The amounts at stake can be very large even though the civil claim will often settle pre-action following pejorative inquest findings.

Some of the principles in play are now helpfully set out in the recent case of Fullick – an appeal of a Deputy Master’s order that the Met Police should pay costs of over £88,000 following the pre-action settlement of a claim for damages for breach of Art 2, negligence and misfeasance in public office in a death involving the police.

The decision is worth a read for its consideration of the purpose and function of an inquest, as well as its setting out of the principles underpinning the recoverability of inquest costs.

R v Lawrence [2019] Wimbledon Magistrates Court

The unprecedented tale of “Dr.” Duncan Lawrence and his withholding of information from a coroner about his involvement in the death of the teenager Sophie Bennett has already gripped the headlines. This highly unusual criminal prosecution of a healthcare staff member who failed to give evidence at an inquest into the death of one of his patients is thought to be the first of its kind under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009[1]. The saga has now taken a further extraordinary turn.

Despite having pleaded “100% guilty” on 16 August 2019, on subsequently attending court for sentencing Lawrence sought and was given an adjournment so that he may consider resiling from his earlier guilty plea.

The question that arises is whether, having already been fined £650 in May 2019 by the Assistant Coroner for his non-attendance at the inquest (pursuant to Schedule 6 part 6 CJA 2009), Lawrence is being put in double jeopardy by the additional criminal prosecution of him under Schedule 6 part 7 of the Act.