An inquest’s scope must not exclude evidence relevant to answering the statutory questions

Leeson v HM Area Coroner for Manchester South (Donald McPherson & nine other interested parties) [2023] EWHC 62 (Admin)

It is a very unusual coronial judicial review that has ten interested parties.  Here nine of the ten were insurance companies with whom the bereaved widower, Mr McPherson, had taken out ‘excessive’ insurance on his wife’s life before she was found drowned in an indoor swimming pool in their remote holiday accommodation.

Mr McPherson was charged with the murder of his wife. Clearly relevant evidence at the criminal trial, when deciding between innocent and sinister explanations for his wife’s drowning, included: the £3.5 million he was set to claim in life insurance, alongside his multiple lies about his background; his substantial debt; his deletion from his dead wife’s iPhone of some call, SMS, chat and image records; his wife’s ignorance of the existence of some of the insurance policies; the false witness signatures on some policies; and his lies to subsequent insurers about having pre-existing life insurance.

The criminal trial judge (Goose J) concluded in a formal ruling that the most ‘likely’ explanation for the death, when taking account of all this circumstantial evidence, was that McPherson had caused his wife to drown.  However, the same judge also found that the criminal jury could not be sure of this when the medical evidence was that the blunt force injuries to her body could equally have been caused by unlawful force or her husband’s rescue and resuscitation attempts.  A half-time submission made twelve days into the criminal trial, therefore succeeded.

In the face of a criminal acquittal Ms Leeson’s father’s only remaining hope was that an inquest might fully explore and determine how his daughter came to be in the swimming pool that evening and whether her injuries arose from rescue attempts or from actions far more malign.

That hope was thwarted, however, when the Area Coroner determined that the scope of the inquest would only cover events between the couple’s arrival on holiday and the day of the death, thereby ruling out any evidence about multiple life insurance policies and much of the other circumstantial evidence pre-and post-dating the holiday that had been explored in the criminal trial.

It is perhaps no surprise that a judicial review claim followed that decision.

PFD reports & PFD evidence: Discretion and Subjectivity

Dillon v Assistant Coroner For Rutland & N Leicestershire [2022] EWHC 3186 KB (Admin)

Challenging a Coroner’s refusal to issue a report to prevent future deaths (‘a PFD report’)[1] is always going to be an uphill struggle. Whilst there is no coronial discretion, and a report is mandatory, if a coroner determines action should be taken to prevent a risk of future deaths continuing, the Divisional Court has now made clear that before coming to that position there is a significant subjective element.

Before the duty to issue a PFD report arises, first, there must be a concern (arising from the investigation) that circumstances creating a risk of other deaths will occur or continue in the future. Secondly, and significantly, the Coroner must have formed the opinion that ‘action should be taken’ to prevent that risk of death.

The Coroner must act rationally in coming to the opinion held, but different coroners could reasonably come to opposite opinions on the same facts without either being wrong to do so. In other words, there is no single, objectively correct answer to the question raised by the second criterion in any particular case.  It is, therefore, no surprise that the Claimant’s challenge failed in this case.

Sandilands, Shoreham and Sala: AIBs and the Coronial Investigation

It is now six years since Singh J and the Lord Chief Justice considered the relationship between Accident Investigation Branch investigations (Rail, Air & Marine) and coroners’ inquests in ‘the Norfolk case’.[1] In that instance the issue was whether a coroner had the power to order the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (“AAIB”) to disclose a cockpit voice and flight data recorder. The Divisional Court said ‘no’. But that’s not important right now…

What was more interesting was what Singh J[2] said about a coroner – who was not an expert in the field – not being required or permitted to “go over the same ground” as an AIB. Lord Thomas agreed and bemoaned the tendency “for different independent bodies … to investigate, either successively or at the same time, the same matter.” He concluded that, if coroners did not defer to AIBs which had the greatest expertise, then public money would be wasted. In the absence of “credible evidence that the investigation into an accident is incomplete, flawed or deficient” then a coroner had no business re-investigating matters covered by the independent investigation of the AAIB.

What then should a coroner do in these circumstances? According to Lord Thomas either: (a) adjourn pending publication of the AIB report or (b) proceed on the assumption that the reasons for the crash will be determined by that report and the issue treated as outside the scope of the Inquest.

Keeping it simple: Article 2 inquests are a relatively summary process

R (Morahan) v HM Coroner for West London and others [2022] EWCA Civ 1410

After a flood of Article 2 decisions in the past few years many will be relieved to learn that the Court of Appeal have firmly rejected the challenge in Morahan (so there is no new law to get to grips with), whilst at the same time sending out a stern message to lawyers that these Article 2 arguments are getting out of hand!

We should remember that “an inquest remains an inquisitorial and relatively summary process. It is not a surrogate public inquiry. ”  Inquests are becoming increasingly legally complex which the Court deprecated as leading to “lengthy delays….a substantial increase in the length with associated escalation in the costs of involvement in coronial proceedings”.

Additionally, the implications of Article 2 engagement are limited – whether it is engaged or not the scope of the inquiry will be the same. The availability of legal aid is the main driver for applications for Article 2 engagement but that should not affect the Court’s determination of the law.

Coroner’s inquest causes a diplomatic incident!

R v Kadir [2022] EWCA Crim 1244

Not a true headline – but one we might well see if the coronial world remains as ignorant as this blogger was until yesterday of the requirement to seek approval from a foreign state before hearing any live oral evidence from abroad.[1]

The Court of Appeal[2] have just handed down their decision in a criminal appeal that includes an important reminder (or warning, if you shared my ignorance) that when hearing evidence by a live link from a witness who is in another country, it is necessary to bear in mind the long existing understanding among Nation States that one state should not seek to exercise the powers of its courts within the territory of another state without the permission (on an individual or a general basis) of that other state.

It should not be simply presumed that all foreign governments are willing to allow their nationals, or others within their jurisdiction, to give evidence before a court in England and Wales via a live link.

Indeed, since the 1970s the Hague Convention[3] has recognised this and so established a uniform framework of co-operation mechanisms in order to facilitate and streamline the taking of evidence from abroad in civil and commercial cases by using an International Letter of Request (ILOR) to the state concerned sent by the judicial authority of a contracting State, to the Central Authority of the other State (see here). But of course not all States are signatories to the Hague Convention and even under this convention permission must be sought unless a Contracting State has declared that evidence may be taken under this Article without its prior permission.

Furthermore, it has been persuasively stated[4] that whenever the issue arises in a tribunal about the taking of evidence from outside the United Kingdom, the question of whether it would be lawful to do so is a question of law for that country, whether or not that country is a signatory to the Hague Convention.  In all cases, therefore, what the Tribunal needs to know is whether it may take such evidence without damaging the United Kingdom’s diplomatic relationship with the other country.

The potential damage includes consideration of wider harm to the interests of justice since, if a court or tribunal acts in such a way as to damage international relations with another State, this risks permission being refused in subsequent criminal and civil cases, where evidence needs to be taken from within that State.